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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ARKANSAS'S-NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE: THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT DEFINES A LIMIT ON THE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO A PRIVATE PARTY. Leathers
v. Gulf Rice Arkansas, Inc., 338 Ark. 425, 994 S.W.2d 481 (1999).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Leathers v. GulfRice Arkansas, Inc.,' the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that the General Assembly could not delegate to a private group of
people (rice producers) the authority to impose an assessment on
another private group of people (rice buyers).2 Previous caselaw
recognized the constitutionality of conditioning the effectiveness of an
assessment on a favorable referendum by those who had to pay the
assessment;3 however, the court found imposing an assessment through
a referendum that did not involve all those affected to be an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative authority.4
This note examines the facts surrounding the creation of the
Arkansas Rice Research and Promotion Board and the effect of Act 344
of 1995 on assessments to support the work of the Board. Next, this
note discusses the evolution of the nondelegation doctrine at the federal
level and in Arkansas. After discussing the reasoning of the court in the
Gulf Rice opinion, this note concludes with a discussion of the signifi-
cance of the court's decision in terms of the limits the decision sets on
legislative delegation, its impact on drafting future legislation, and some
remaining unanswered questions.
II. FACTS
Act 725 of 1985 ("Act 725") created the Arkansas Rice Research
and Promotion Board ("Board") with nine producer members.5 Act 725
also assessed the producers $0.03 per bushel on all rice grown within the
state.6 The Act required the producers to approve the assessment by a
three-fifths vote before imposition.7 Even though the assessment was
mandatory, any producer could apply for and receive a refund from the
1. 338 Ark. 425, 994 S.W.2d 481 (1999).
2. See id. at 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
3. See id. at 433, 994 S.W.2d at 484-85.
4. See id. at 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
5. See id. at 428, 994 S.W.2d at 482. Act 725 was codified, in part, at Arkansas
Code Annotated section 2-20-507 (Michie Repi. 1996). See id. at 428, 994 S.W.2d at
482.
6. See id. at 425, 994 S.W.2d at 482.
7. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 425, 994 S.W.2d at 482.
UALR LAW REVIEW
Department of Finance and Administration ("DFA"). The first buyers
of Arkansas rice collected and remitted the assessment funds to the
DFA.9 The DFA then deposited the assessments collected into a special
fund with the State Treasurer until allocated for research and extension
projects through the University of Arkansas and market development
projects through the United States of America Rice Council."°
Act 344 of 1995 ("Act 344") authorized the Board to refer an
alternative assessment to the rice producers of the state." By this
referendum, the rice producers could authorize assessments of $0.0135
per bushel against rice buyers and up to $0.0150 per bushel against rice
producers.". Act 344 did not allow rice buyers to vote in the referen-
dum, and neither rice buyers nor producers could obtain refunds. 3 In
February 1996, by a vote of 4,271 to 1,649, the rice producers adopted
the alternate assessment imposing a $0.0135 per bushel assessment on
rice buyers. 4
Gulf Rice Arkansas, Inc. and Gulf Pacific Rice Co. (collectively
referred to as "Gulf Rice") subsequently brought suit against Tim
Leathers, State Commissioner of Revenues, and the individual directors
of the Board (collectively referred to as the "Board") in Pulaski County
Chancery Court. 5 Riceland Foods, Inc., Producers Rice Mill, Inc., and
Riviana Foods, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Riceland") intervened
8. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 482. Arkansas Code Annotated section 2-20-509
authorized the refund. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-20-509 (Michie Repl. 1996).
9. See Appellant's Brief at ix, Leathers v. GulfRice Ark., Inc., 338 Ark. 425,994
S.W.2d 481 (1999) (No. 98-737). The term "first buyer" is a descriptive term referring
to buyers of Arkansas rice at the first point of sale, as opposed to subsequent
purchasers. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-20-511 (a) (Michie Repl. 1996).
10. See Appellant's Brief at ix, Gulf Rice (No. 98-737).
11. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 425,994 S.W.2d at 482. Act 344 of 1995 is codified
at Arkansas Code Annotated section 2-20-511. See Gulf Rice at 428,994 S.W.2d at 482.
12. See id. at 428, 994 S.W.2d at 482. When Act 344 was codified, the decimal
place was incorrectly moved two places to the right while specifying the assessments.
See id. n. 1, 944 S.W.2d at 482 n. I. Arkansas Code Annotated section 2-20-511 provides
for assessments of $1.35 per bushel for rice buyers and up to $1.50 per bushel for
producers instead of $0.0 135 for buyers and up to $0.0 150 per bushel for producers.
See id. n.1, 994 S.W.2d at 482 n.1.
13. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 482-83. Act 344 allowed no refund notwithstanding
section 2-20-509. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-20-51 l(b)(2) (Michie Repl. 1996).
14. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 428, 994 S.W.2d at 483. The Pulaski County
Chancery Court's decree described the effect of the referendum as the producers voting
to reduce their assessment from $0.03 to $0.0115 per bushel and,"at the same time,
imposing on the first-point-of-sale buyers a new assessment of $0.0 135 per bushel. See
Appellant's Brief at Addendum 4, Gulf Rice (No. 98-737).
15. See GulfRice, 338 Ark. at 425, 994 S.W.2d at 482.
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on behalf of the Board. 6 Gulf Rice alleged that Act 344 was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative taxing power in violation of
Article II, Section 23 and Article XVI, Section 13 of the Arkansas
Constitution. 7 The chancery court granted Gulf Rice's motion for
summary judgment, finding Act 344 to be an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority. 8 The Board and Riceland appealed to the
Arkansas Supreme Court. 9
III. BACKGROUND
The nondelegation doctrine is the judicial interpretation of what
authority a legislative body can delegate to another branch of govern-
ment, administrative agencies, or non-governmental entities.2" While
similar at both state and federal levels, the nondelegation doctrine
followed different paths in the federal courts and Arkansas courts.
A. The Federal Nondelegation Doctrine
1. Roots of the Nondelegation Doctrine: Nature of the Power
Delegated
In its earliest form, the nondelegation doctrine was the judicial
principle that Congress may not delegate its constitutional law-making
powers to another entity.2 Chief Justice Rehnquist traced the
16. See id. at 427, 994 S.W.2d at 482.
17. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 482. Article 11, Section 23 provides that "[t]he General
Assembly may delegate the taxing power... to the State's subordinate political and
municipal corporations to the extent of providing for their existence, maintenance and
well being, but no further." ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 11, § 23. Article XVI, Section
13 provides that "[a]ny citizen of any county, city or town may institute suit in behalf
of himself and all others interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against the
enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever." Id. at art. XVI, § 13.
18. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 427, 994 S.W.2d at 482. At trial, the Board argued
that the assessment was not unconstitutional because it was a "fee" assessed pursuant
to the state's police powers, rather than a "tax." See Appellant's Brief at 95-99, Gulf
Rice (No. 98-737). The chancery court concluded that the legislature unlawfully
delegated its authority regardless of whether the assessment was considered a "tax" or
a "fee." See id. at Addendum 5.
19. See Gulf Rice, 388 Ark. at 427, 994 S.W.2d at 482.
20. See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 288-312 (1998) (discussing
the delegation of legislative powers). American Jurisprudence presents background
material and case summaries on the different types of delegation.
2 1. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452,478-79 (1989). See also Todd E. Pettys, The
Intended Relationship between Administrative Regulations and Section 1983's "Laws ", 67
2000] 299
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philosophical basis of the nondelegation doctrine back to the writings
of John Locke in 1690.2 Prior to the twentieth century, the courts
looked to the nature of the power that was being delegated to see if it
was essentially legislative or law-making in nature.23
While still looking to the law-making nature of the act, in 1892, the
United States Supreme Court in Field v. Clark4 foreshadowed the more
modem nondelegation principle.25 The legislation authorized the
President to impose tariffs in retaliation for tariffs imposed by any
foreign country on certain United States goods.26 The Court held that
the delegation was constitutional because Congress had defined the
nature of the goods and tariffs and the President was only asked to
determine if a fact (the imposition of tariffs) had occurred.27
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 86 (1998). One commentator defined the current nondelegation
principle in a circular manner to emphasize the wide latitude granted to Congress.
"Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the
statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them." Gary Lawson, The Rise
and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1231, 1239 (1994). The United
States Constitution provides a basis for the nondelegation doctrine in Article 1, Section
1: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives." See U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 1.
22. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-73
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). To support his position, Justice Rehnquist quoted
Locke:
The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive
voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the
legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and
place it in other hands.
Id.
23. See Pettys, supra note 21, at 87. In the early nineteenth century the Court
upheld the delegation of legislative authority to the President to revive a trade statute
because Congress had fully expressed its will. See id. at 88 (summarizing Cargo of the
Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. 382 (1813)).
24. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
25. See id. at 694.
26. See Pettys, supra note 21, at 89.
27. See Field, 143 U.S. at 694 ("Mhe legislature cannot delegate its power to make
a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. )
(quoting Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491,498 (1873)).
300 [Vol. 23
NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
2. Evolution of the Nondelegation Doctrine: Extent of Legislative
Power Delegated
With the expansion of administrative agencies and delegations of
authority to them, the nondelegation doctrine began to shift.28 Early in
this century, two cases established principles that have influenced
judicial decisions into this decade: United States v. Grimaud29 and J. W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States." In Grimaud, the Supreme Court
held that Congress could outline the legislative scheme and allow the
agency to fill in the details by providing the specific means and methods
to implement the legislative scheme.3' In Hampton, the Court estab-
lished the "intelligible principle" test, which stated that delegation of
authority to an agency was permissible so long as the statute set out an
intelligible principle to which the regulations were to conform.32 In the
time between the Court's decisions in Grimaud and Hampton, one
commentator insists, over criticism, that the Court held at least three
legislative acts to be unconstitutional delegations of authority.33
The intelligible principle test of the nondelegation doctrine has
been described as having only one good year.34 In 1935, the Court
struck down two sections of the National Recovery Act as delegating
legislative authority without an intelligible principle." Over the next
28. See Pettys, supra note 21, at 89. See also Farina, supra note 21, at 483.
29. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
30. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
31. See Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 517. The Court relied on a suggestion by Chief
Justice Marshall made in dicta that "[a] general provision may be made, and power
given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details." Id.(citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1825)).
32. See Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409 ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power.").
33. See David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20
CARDOZO L. REv. 731, 736 (1999). Schoenbrod asserted that three cases were reversed
on grounds of unconstitutional delegation. See Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co.,
264 U.S. 219 (1924) (prohibiting the delegation of authority to the states to apply state
worker compensation laws in admiralty cases); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,
255 U.S. 81 (1921) (finding a statute that criminalized charging unreasonable prices for
necessities to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the judiciary,
and also finding the statute unconstitutionally vague); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (prohibiting the delegation authority to federal courts to
apply state worker compensation laws in admiralty cases).
34. See Nondelegation: The D.C. Circuit Resurrects Lazarus (Maybe), JUD./LEGIS.
WATCH REP., July 1999, at 1.
35. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42
(1935) (declaring section 3 ofthe National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional for
2000]
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half century, the Court did not hold any other legislation to be unconsti-
tutional for delegating legislative authority to another branch of the
federal government.36 In 1974, Justice Marshall declared that the
nondelegation doctrine was all but dead.3" The courts have allowed very
broad applications of the intelligible principle test, ranging from public
convenience, interest, and necessity38 to fair and equitable prices, just
and reasonable rates, excessive profits, and compelling public interest.39
The Court has approved the involvement of non-governmental parties
when a law was implemented after a favorable referendum vote by the
group intimately affected.'
3. Modern Nondelegation Doctrine: Interpretation of the Power
Delegated
In 1980, Justice Rehnquist expressed interest in resurrecting the
nondelegation doctrine in Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum Institute.41 Even though Justice Rehnquist argued in a
concurring opinion that Congress had impermissibly delegated its
authority, the Court held that the delegation was proper, but that the
Secretary of Labor had overstepped his authority in exercising that
power.42 The Court has been hesitant to restrict broad delegation of
authority because the size and complexity of the federal government
delegating legislative power without adequate standards). See also Panama Ref. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (declaring section 9(c) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act unconstitutional for delegating legislative power without an intelligible
principle).
36. See Lawson, supra note 21, at 1240.
37. See Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345,352-53
(1974). In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall stated: "The notion that the
Constitution narrowly confines the power of Congress to delegate authority to
administrative agencies, which was briefly in vogue in the 1930s, has been virtually
abandoned by the Court.. " d. (Marshall, J., concurring).
38. See William A. Niskanen, Legislative Implications of Reasserting Congressional
Authority over Regulations, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 939, 940 (1999).
39. See Nondelegation, supra note 34, at 1.
40. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op, 307 U.S. 533, 578 (1939). See also
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 17 (1939).
41. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
42. See Peter H. Aranson, et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 15 (1982). The Court's plurality opinion referencedA.L.A. Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining in interpreting the Occupational Safety and Health Act as requiring a
threshold level of risk before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration could
regulate the benzene industry, rather than finding an unconstitutional delegation of
authority. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646.
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precludes Congress from micro-managing the agencies.43 Shortly after
American Petroleum, the Court ruled in Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.," that agencies, not the courts, should
resolve ambiguities in statutory language and that courts should give
deference to the agency's interpretation."
Recently, in American TruckingAss 'ns v. United States EPA,' the D.C.
Circuit drew significant media attention by its use of nondelegation
language.47 However, the ruling was actually consistent with American
Petroleum because it was the EPA's interpretation of the statute that the
court found objectionable, not the statute itself.48  In 1998, the
nondelegation doctrine was argued before the Court in Clinton v. City of
43. See Lawson, supra note 21, at 1241. In 1989 the Court explained that "[olur
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). See also Marci A.
Hamilton, Representation andNondelegation: BacktoBasics, 20 CARDOZOL. REv. 807,821
n.80 (1999).
44. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
45. See id. at 843-45. See also Damien J. Marshall, The Application of Chevron
Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263, 263 (1998). One
commentator described the Chevron decision as follows: "Congress may give agencies
primary responsibility not only for making policy within the limits of their organic
statutes, but also for defining those limits whenever the text and surrounding legislative
materials are ambiguous." Farina, supra note 21, at 487-88. In 1991, the D.C. Circuit
reaffirmed "the Court's current general practice of applying the nondelegation doctrine
mainly in the form of 'giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might
otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.'" UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1316
(D.C. Cir. 1991), approved on reh 'g, 37 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. .1994). The court remanded
the issue to allow the agency to explain how its approach conforms to a constitutional
interpretation of the act. See id. at 1322.
46. 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
47. See Steve France, Lost in the Ozone: Scuttling of New Clean Air Act Provisions
Revives Anti-New Deal Doctrine, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at 26, 26 (1999); New from the
Circuits, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS Summer, 1999, at 6.
48. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1033.
[W]e find that the construction of the Clean Air Act on which EPA relied in
promulgating the [National Ambient Air Quality Standards] at issue here
effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. We remand the
cases for EPA to develop a construction of the act that satisfies this
constitutional requirement.
Id. (citations omitted). Later, the court explained its decision in language similar to that
in American Petroleum:
Where (as here) statutory language and an existing agency interpretation
involve an unconstitutional delegation of power, but an interpretation
without the constitutional weakness is or may be available, our response is
not to strike down the statute but to give the agency an opportunity to extract




New Yoret 9 as justification for holding the Line Item Veto Act5
unconstitutional.5 However, the Court found the line item veto to be
unconstitutional on other grounds and did not rule on the nondelegation
issue.5
2
B. The Nondelegation Doctrine in Arkansas
While federal caselaw has persuasive value, the state's constitution.
controls the constitutionality of the delegation of legislative authority
within that state, not the United States Constitution.53 As a result, the
permissible delegation of state legislative authority is determined by
each state'sjudicial interpretation of its constitution and legislative acts.
1. The Nature of Power Delegated to Arkansas Agencies
Arkansas has over 300 boards and commissions, the members of
which are appointed by the Governor.54 The General Assembly
delegates to each board or commission the powers necessary to carry out
their duties and responsibilities.
The General Assembly is not limited to delegating legislative
powers, but may also delegate executive and judicial powers.5 6 For
49. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
50. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691 etseq.
51. See id. at 447-48 ("We have been favored with extensive debate about the
scope of Congress' power to delegate law-making authority, [however, it] does not
really bear on the narrow issue that is dispositive of these cases."). Id. See generally
Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma
and the Line Item Veto, 44 ViIa. L. REV. 189 (1999) (discussing the nondelegation
doctrine in relation to the line item veto).
52. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448 ("[B]ecause we conclude that the Act's
cancellation provisions violate Article I, § 7, of the Constitution, we find it unnecessary
to consider the District Court's alternative holding that the Act'impermissibly disrupts
the balance of powers among the three branches of government."'). Id.
53. See Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 189 P.2d 17, 23 (Cal. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948) ("The Constitution of the United States has no voice
in determining whether power conferred on a board or commission set up by a state
statute involves an unlawful delegation of legislative power."). Author's note: While
nondelegation issues may incorporate delegations between branches of government,
this note will focus on delegations to agencies, boards, and commissions in Arkansas.
54. See Suzanne Antley, Judicial Review of Non-Court Decisions: A Constitutionally
Based Examination of Arkansas' Review System, 49 ARK. L. REv. 425, 426 & n. 1 (1996).
55. See id. at 427.
56. States' delegation doctrines have been grouped into three categories as follows:
strict standards and safeguards states, in which powers must be specifically defined in
legislation; loose standards and safeguards states, in which the legislature need only
provide a general scheme; and procedural safeguards states that rely on notice,
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example, the Public Service Commission may exercise both the
legislative powers of promulgating rules and regulations and thej udicial
power of conducting hearings at the request of a regulated industry."
The Arkansas Supreme Court characterized the Arkansas Highway
Commission as simply an "agency of government" because it promul-
gates rules and regulations (legislative power), enforces them (executive
power), and can conduct hearings (judicial power)."
The mixing of legislative, executive, and judicial powers led the
court to declare that the delegation of powers of agencies in Arkansas
should not be evaluated in terms of the branch of government they
emulate, but in terms of the powers granted and withheld by the
legislature.59 When considering the constitutionality of the power
delegated, the court has looked to whether the agency was acting in an
executive, legislative, orjudicial manner. ° The court examines whether
the agency was promulgating a rule or administering an existing rule.6
2. Procedural Standards
The Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act62 ("AAPA") appears
to provide a basis for examining nondelegation issues under any of the
three general theories employed at different times at the federal leve) as
follows: the nature of the power, the extent of the power, or the
interpretation of the power.63 However, nothing in the AAPA can repeal
hearings, and judicial review to restrict the agency's power. See Gary J. Greco,
Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 567, 579-80 (1994). Greco determined that Arkansas and Utah did not fit into
any of the three categories. See id. at 579 n.66. Relying on Arkansas Motor Carriers
Ass 'n v. Pritchett, 303 Ark. 620, 798 S.W.2d 918 (1990), Greco concluded that agencies
in Arkansas were neither legislative nor executive in nature but could have a mixture
of powers as delegated by the legislature.
57. See Antley, supra note 54, at 431.
58. See Arkansas Motor Carriers, 303 Ark. at 624-25. 798 S.W.2d at 920.
59. See id. at 624-25, 798 S.W.2d at 920.
60. See Antley, supra note 54, at 437-39.
61. See Antley, supra note 54, at 437 n.52 ("The crucial test for determining what
is legislative and what is administrative is whether the ordinance is one making a new
law, or one executing a law already in existence.") (quoting Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark.
137, 143, 228 S.W.2d 995, 998 (1950)).
62. This act is codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 25-15-201 to 25-15-
214.
63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212 (Michie Supp. 1999). Subsection (h) of
section 25-15-212 provides six bases for judicial review of agency decisions that are:
"(1) [iun violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) [i]n excess of the
agency's statutory authority; (3) [m]ade upon unlawful procedure; (4) [alffected by
other error or law; (5) [n]ot supported by substantial evidence of record; or (6)
2000]
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authority specifically delegated to an agency." The AAPA exempts the
following commissions: the Arkansas Public Service Commission, the
State Highway Commission, the State Highway and Transportation
Department, the Commission on Pollution Control and Ecology, the
Contractors Licensing Board, the State Department of Health, the
Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission, the Employment
Security Department, and the Department of Veterans' Affairs.65 The
General Assembly exempted these agencies because the enabling acts
for these agencies provided adequate administrative procedures.6
Arkansas courts also provide varying levels and scopes of review
for the decisions of agencies excepted from the AAPA.67 Generally, the
courts apply the same level and scope of review to all decisions
rendered by an agency, regardless of whether the decision is legislative,
executive, or judicial in nature."
3. Delegation of Power to Regulatory Agencies
The General Assembly cannot delegate powers that are strictly law-
making in nature.' However, the General Assembly may establish
boards and commissions and delegate to them both the power to
determine the facts under which a law may take effect as well as the
power to determine the details needed to implement general legislative
[a]rbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion." ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-
15-212(h) (Michie Supp. 1999). Author's note: Viewed in terms of the three phases
of nondelegation at the federal level, reasons one and three would fall under the nature
of the power delegated, while reasons two and four would fall under the extent of the
power delegated. In addition, reasons five and six would fall under the interpretation
of the power delegated.
64. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-202(IXC) (Michie Supp. 1999). This section
states: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal delegations of authority
as provided by law...." Id.
65. See Antley, supra note 53, at 445-46.
66. See id. at 446. The Arkansas Code states as follows: "The word 'agency' shall
not include the Arkansas Public Service Commission, the Arkansas Pollution Control
and Ecology Commission, the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the
Employment Security Department, it being determined by the General Assembly that
the existing laws governing those agencies provide adequate administrative procedures
for those agencies .... " ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-202(IXB) (Michie Supp. 1999).
67. See Antley, supra note 53, at 449.
68. See id. at 449.
69. See Thompson v. Trice, 145 Ark. 143, 146-47, 223 S.W. 367, 368 (1920)
(holding that "[tJhe Legislature cannot delegate to another its power to enact laws, but




provisions. 0 The court has also found that an agency's specifically
delegated power includes additional implied powers necessary to carry
out the General Assembly's mandate."' If the general guidelines and
standards are vague because they lack sufficient detail, the delegation
of legislative authority may be unconstitutional.' Arkansas courts have
generally upheld legislation that becomes effective only after a
favorable vote by those affected by the legislation."
4. Delegation of Power to Licensing Boards
Arkansas courts have upheld legislative delegation of discretionary
power to a licensing board if the delegated power is accompanied by
legislatively established guidelines.74 The guidelines must provide
standards for the licensing authority to follow. 75 If the statute bestows
absolute, unregulated, or undefined discretion to an agency, it is
unlawfully delegated power.76
5. Delegation of Taxing Authority
Arkansas treats taxing authority differently than other delegations
because Article I, Section 23 of the Arkansas Constitution prohibits the
delegation of taxing powers by the legislature to entities other than
subordinate governmental entities." The legislature may delegate
70. See Venhaus v. State exrei. Lofton, 285 Ark. 23, 27-28, 684 S.W.2d 252, 255
(1985); McArthur v. Smallwood, 225 Ark. 328, 331, 281 S.W.2d 428, 431 (1955).
71. See Hickenbottom v. McCain, 207 Ark. 485, 491-92, 181 S.W.2d 226, 229
(1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944) (noting that when legislative power is
delegated, the delegation implicitly confers the power to do that which is deemed
necessary to carry out the delegated legislative power).
72. See Crowly v. Thornbrough, 226 Ark. 768, 774, 294 S.W.2d 62, 66 (1956)
(holding that a statute that authorized the United States Secretary of Labor to determine
minimum wages based on similar projects in the area was unconstitutional because it
failed to establish a standard or formula for the wage scale).
73. See Swanberg v. Tart, 300 Ark. 304, 311, 778 S.W.2d 931, 934 (1989)
(upholding a voter referendum on Sunday horse racing in Hot Springs).
74. See McQuay v. Arkansas State Bd. of Architects, 337 Ark. 339, 344, 989
S.W.2d 499, 501 (1999). See also Patton v. Ragland, 282 Ark. 231, 234, 668 S.W.2d
3,5(1984).
75. See McQuay, 337 Ark. at 339,989 S.W.2d at 501. See also Arkansas State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Hall, 243 Ark. 741, 745-46, 421 S.W.2d 888, 890 (1967).
76. See McQuay, 337 Ark. at 339, 989 S.W.2d at 501. See also Alcoholic Beverage
Control Div. v. R.C. Edwards Distrib. Co., 284 Ark. 336, 339-40, 681 S.W.2d 356,
358-59 (1984).
77. See ARK. CoNST. of 1874, art. i, § 23. This section states "the General
Assembly may delegate the taxing power, with the necessary restriction, to the State's
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taxing authority to subordinate political and municipal corporations."8
Taxing privileges may not be allocated to local improvement districts,
such as sewer or road improvement districts.79
Any delegation related to taxes should be specific in its details.80
If a statute fails to specify a particular method for computing the tax but
leaves the computation up to the discretion of a court, the legislature has
improperly delegated power to the judiciary.8 Yet when the statute
provides a complete plan, the legislation can require that the tax will not
become effective until after a favorable vote in a referendum by those
who will pay the tax.82
IV. REASONING OF THECOURT
In Leathers v. Gulf Rice Arkansas, Inc.,83 the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that the General Assembly cannot authorize private rice producers
to impose an assessment on private rice buyers through a referendum in
which only rice producers vote without providing safeguards such as
notice, hearing, or review before the assessment is imposed on rice
buyers." The court affirmed the chancery court's summary judgment
in favor of Gulf Rice, holding that Act 344 unconstitutionally delegated
legislative authority.85 The majority opinion focused on the denial of
due process,86 while the dissent argued that Gulf Rice had not met its
subordinate political and municipal corporations to the extent of providing for their
existence, maintenance and well being, but no further." Id.
78. See Waldrop v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 131 Ark. 453,459-60, 199 S.W. 369,
371 (1917). See also Keel v. Board of Directors, 59 Ark. 513, 528-29,27 S.W. 590, 592
(1894); City of Little Rock v. Prather, 46 Ark. 471, 477 (1885).
79. See Whaley v. Northern Rd. Improvement Dist., 152 Ark. 573, 576-77, 240
S.W. 1, 2 (1922).
80. See Holloway, Inc. v. Pine Ridge Addition Residential Property Owners, 332
Ark. 450, 455, 966 S.W.2d 241, 244 (1998).
81. See id., 966 S.W.2d at 244 (holding that "the absence of language.., directing
the chancery court to use a particular method for computing the tax levy bestows upon
the judiciary a nondelegable power of the legislature in violation of the separation of
powers provisions of the Arkansas Constitution").
82. See Boyd v. Weiss, 333 Ark. 684, 689, 971 S.W.2d 237, 240 (1998). The
statute supplied a detailed scheme of what the tax status would be if the people of
Texarkana approved it. See id., 971 S.W.2d at 240.
83. 338 Ark. 425, 994 S.W.2d 481 (1999).
84. See id. at 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
85. See id. at 434, 994 S.W.2d at 486. Justice Glaze wrote the majority opinion.
See id. at 427, 994 S.W.2d at 482. Justice Brown wrote the dissenting opinion in which
Special Associate Justices Sanders and Davisjoined. See id. at 434, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
Justices Corbin and Thornton did not participate. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 486.
86. See id. at 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
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burden of proving Act 344 unconstitutional, and therefore, the case
should have been remanded to chancery court for further development
of the due process issue."7
A. Majority Opinion
The pivotal issue in Gulf Rice was that Act 344 denied rice buyers
due process.88  The assessment was imposed upon the buyers by a
referendum in which only the rice producers voted.89 Thus, Act 344 did
not give the buyers notice, a hearing and opportunity to be heard, or the
benefit of a review. 9°
Justice Glaze found the arguments of the Board and Riceland to be
unpersuasive. The Board argued that Act 344 must be presumed
constitutional9' and that the delegation of decision-making authority in
Act 344 fell within the limits set out by the United States Supreme
Court92 in Currin v. Wallace93 and UnitedStates v. Rock Royal Co-Op.94 The
constitutional test in RockRoyal considered whether the enactment stated
the purpose and the standards sufficiently so that those affected by the
enactment could understand them.9" According to the Gulf Rice court's
interpretation of Rock Royal, Congress need only specify standards as
reasonably practicable." While acknowledging that legislation may
delegate details that are impractical for Congress to administer, the Gulf
Rice court interpreted the constitutional test in Currin as whether a
congressional act tries to abdicate or delegate an essential constitutional
87. See id. at 434, 994 S.W.2d at 486 (Brown, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at 486. The court used the term "due process"
without designating whether the due process violation was substantive, procedural, or
both. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 486. Counsel for Gulf Rice claimed a procedural due
process violation. See id. at 436, 994 S.W.2d at 487. In its brief, Gulf Rice argued that
the due process violation was the result of a lack of fairness in the producer-only
referendum that imposed an assessment on non-voting rice buyers. See Appellee's
Brief at 28, 32-33 & n.3, Leathers v. Gulf Rice Ark., Inc., 338 Ark. 425, 994 S.W.2d
481 (1999) (No. 98-737).
89. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 428, 994 S.W.2d at 482-83.
90. See id. at 433, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
91. See id. at 429, 994 S.W.2d at 483.
92. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 483.
93. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
94. 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
95. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 429, 994 S.W.2d at 483. See also Rock Royal, 307
U.S. at 574.




legislative function to another body." The Board argued that Act 344
did not delegate authority but merely established a referendum as a
condition precedent to the assessment becoming effective.9 The court
did not agree, finding that Act 344 instead authorized rice producers to
shift the existing assessment from them to rice buyers."
Gulf Rice argued that the rice buyers had been denied due process
because the assessment was levied on them without the opportunity to
vote or have a hearing or a review."° Gulf Rice cited Carter v. Carter
Coal Co. "' to support the contention that the most obnoxious form of
unlawful delegation is a delegation that empowers a private majority to
regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority. 2 The court rejected the
Board's attempt to distinguish Carter on grounds that the Board was
delegated the power to call the referendum.0 3 The Board argued that
Act 344 was constitutional because the General Assembly delegated the
power to call the referendum to the Board, a legislatively created
agency, rather than directly to the rice producers."l According to the
court, the real issue was not who was empowered to call a referendum
but that the rice buyers were not permitted to vote in the referendum.0 5
The court further noted that even if it were relevant, the Board included
only rice producers."°
While recognizing that the General Assembly had the power to pass
a law and specify a referendum as a condition precedent to the law
becoming effective, the court stated that the Board weakened its case by
citing authority in which those most directly affected by the law were
allowed to vote in the referendum.' By contrast, the referendum
authorized by Act 344 failed to provide a vote to those most affected by
the assessment, the rice buyers.'
The majority then turned to the treatise State and FederalAdministra-
tive Law to explain that many states have voided attempts to delegate
authority to private entities because of concerns that private parties
97. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 483. See also Currin, 306 U.S. at 15.
98. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 429, 994 S.W.2d at 483.
99. See id. at 429-30, 994 S.W.2d at 483.
100. See id. at 430, 994 S.W.2d at 483.
101. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
102. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 430, 994 S.W.2d at 484.
103. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 484.
104. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 484.
105. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 484.
106. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 484.
107. See id. at 431, 994 S.W.2d at 484.
108. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 431, 994 S.W.2d at 484.
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would put personal gain ahead of public welfare.' However, such
delegation would not be constitutionally suspect if the private entity's
actions were subject to an impartial administrative body." The court
noted that not only did Act 344 deny rice buyers a vote, but it also
provided no administrative safeguards or standards to measure the
Board's referendum call."'
The court distinguished the current case from Rock Royal, in which
only milk producers were permitted to vote to effectuate legislation
affecting milk handlers." 2  In Rock Royal, the milk handlers were
afforded notice, an opportunity for a hearing, a review by the Secretary
of Agriculture, and were provided a list of factors to be considered in
evaluating the decision."'
The Board also cited Currin to support the constitutionality of
legislative delegation."4 However, in Currin, those most intimately
affected by the Tobacco Inspection Act were given the power to
determine whether it applied to them."' Finally, the court described as
disingenuous the Board's argument that because the General Assembly
had the power to impose the assessment, the procedure for effectuating
it was unimportant."" The court noted that the Board cited no support-
ing authority and that the argument ignored the due process issue."7
The court concluded that Act 344 forced an assessment on rice
buyers without establishing any standards to be considered prior to
imposing the assessment." 8 Further, the assessment was imposed
without notice, opportunity to be heard, or review."9 The court found
Act 344 especially offensive because it authorized one group of private
persons (rice producers) to impose an assessment on another unwilling
group of private persons (rice buyers). 20 Accordingly, the court upheld
109. See id. at 432, 994 S.W.2d at 485 (citing ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL
AswMow, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATE LAW § 7.3, at 460 (1989)).
110. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 485 (citing ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOw,
STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.3, at 460 (1989)).
111. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 485.
112. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 485.
113. Seeid. at433, 994 S.W.2d at 485.
114. See GulfRice, 338 Ark. at 433,994 S.W.2d at 485. See also Currin, 306 U.S. at
15.
115. See id at 433,994 S.W.2d at 485. The Tobacco Inspection Act provided that
the regulations would not be imposed on tobacco growers unless first approved by a
two-thirds vote of the growers. See Currin, 306 U.S. at 15.
116. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 433, 994 S.W.2d at 485.
117. Seeid.,994 S.W.2d at 486.
118. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 486.
119. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 486.
120. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 486.
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the chancery court's decree that Act 344 was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority.'
B. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion Justice Brown noted that Gulf Rice was a
case of national significance decided without the issues being thor-
oughly argued and briefed before the chancery court.' Because the
case presented a new issue not only for Arkansas but also for the nation,
the due process issue should have been fully argued at the chancery
court before reaching the Arkansas Supreme Court, according to Justice
Brown. 
23
The thrust of the dissent was that Gulf Rice failed to meet its
burden of proving a clear incompatibility between Act 344 and the
Arkansas Constitution.'24 The dissent asserted that Gulf Rice did not
sufficiently develop its due process argument before the chancery
court.' 25 The dissent faulted the majority for improperly relying on the
due process argument even though neither the complaint, the motion for
summary judgment, the chancery court's letter ruling, nor the chancery
court's decree granting summary judgment specifically raised the issue
of due process. 26 Gulf Rice only briefed violation of due process on
appeal. 27 Therefore, the dissent would have reversed and remanded the
case to the chancery court to allow both sides to develop and argue the
issue of due process.' 28
The dissent next noted that the majority overlooked the complete-
ness of the plan developed by Act 344. 129 The court had previously held
legislation constitutional which provided a complete plan and held that
a referendum was merely a condition precedent to enabling the plan.'3°
The dissent concluded by listing a number of unanswered questions
121. See id at 434, 994 S.W.2d at 486. In a footnote, the court commented that, as
in chancery court, it was unnecessary to address the issue of whether the assessment
was a valid fee or an invalid tax. See id. n.3, 994 S.W.2d at 486 n.3.
122. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 435, 994 S.W.2d at 487 (Brown, J., dissenting).
123. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 487 (Brown, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 434, 994 S.W.2d at 486 (Brown, I., dissenting).
125. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 486 (Brown, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 434-35, 994 S.W.2d at 486 (Brown, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 435, 994 S.W.2d at 487 (Brown, J., dissenting).
128. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 435, 994 S.W.2d at 486-87 (Brown, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 435-36, 994 S.W.2d at 487 (Brown, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 436,994 S.W.2d at 487 (Brown, J., dissenting) (citing Boyd v. Weiss,




supporting its assertion that the majority's opinion was not justified 3'
because Gulf Rice did not meet its burden of proof.'
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of the Gulf Rice decision lies in three areas. First,
Gulf Rice establishes a limit to the General Assembly's power to
delegate authority. Second, the decision provides guidelines for drafting
future legislation. Third, some questions in Gulf Rice remain unan-
swered.
A. Establishing a Limit on the Delegation of Legislative Authority
In Gulf Rice, the Arkansas Supreme Court established a limit to the
General Assembly's power to delegate its law-making authority to
boards or commissions. By declaring Act 344 unconstitutional, the
court prohibited the legislature from delegating power to one group of
private individuals to levy an assessment on another group of private
individuals."'
The significance of the court's ruling can best be understood by
recapping where Act 344 went beyond constitutional limitations. First,
by establishing a referendum allowing only rice producers to vote on an
assessment that applied to both producers and rice buyers, the legislature
delegated its power to levy assessments to those private individuals
voting in the referendum. 34 Second, the rice buyers were not protected
by normal procedural safeguards. 3 The AAPA or the specific enabling
legislation ususally provides procedural safeguards to the decisions of
Arkansas boards and commissions. 36 However, Act 344 bypassed the
procedural safeguards by not providing for notice, an opportunity to be
heard, or a review to a responsible agency. 
7
The narrowness of the court's decision in Gulf Rice is evident from
the types of delegation the court left intact. The court did not overrule
Swanberg v. Tart,' the Hot Springs Sunday racing referendum case, or
131. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 487 (Brown, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 437, 994 S.W.2d at 488 (Brown, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 434, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
134. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
135. See id. at 433, 994 S.W.2d at 485.
136. See Antley, supra note 54, at 445-46.
137. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 433, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
138. 300 Ark. 304, 778 S.W.2d 931 (1989).
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Boyd v. Weiss,'3 9 the Texarkana tax referendum case. In Swanberg and
Boyd, the legislation provided the details for a complete plan that was to
be implemented only after a favorable vote by those most intimately
affected by the legislation. Also, the court did not reverse McQuay v.
Arkansas State Board of Architects, 40 the Board of Architects licensing
case, or Arkansas State Board of Pharmacy v. Hall,"' the Board of
Pharmacy licensing case. The AAPA provides procedural safeguards
to those affected by professional licensing requirements. The Gulf Rice
decision did not reverse any previous Arkansas Supreme Court ruling.
Thus, GulfRice should be viewed not as a change of the court's previous
interpretations of the nondelegation doctrine, but as a narrow decision
establishing a limit to the General Assembly's power to delegate
authority to boards and commissions.
13. Providing Guidelines for Future Legislation
The Gulf Rice decision appears to provide two guidelines for the
drafting of future legislation for Arkansas boards and commissions.
First, if the legislation contains the details for a complete planto be
implemented only after a referendum, the voters in the referendum must
include all those intimately affected by the legislation. Second, if a
board is to be given the discretion to levy an assessment, those affected
by the assessment must be protected by procedural safeguards through
the AAPA or through a board's enabling legislation.
C. Questions Left Unanswered
The court left several questions unanswered that could affect the
drafting of future legislation delegating power to Arkansas boards and
commissions." 2 The primary question affecting future legislation is
139. 333 Ark. 684, 971 S.W.2d 237 (1998).
140. 337 Ark. 339, 989 S.W.2d 499 (1999).
141. 243 Ark. 741, 421 S.W.2d 888 (1967).
142. In his dissent, Justice Brown identified eight issues that he asserted were left
unanswered:
[W]hat brand of due process is being endorsed [in this case][?] ... Where
is the caselaw to support this theory of procedural due process? Is the due-
process claim a separate basis for relief or is it an integral part of Gulf Rice's
unlawful delegation claim? If due process is the basis for voiding Act 344,
should the Rice Board not have the opportunity to argue that there is a
legitimate government interest or rational basis at stake here? Does rice
promotion benefit first buyers of rice who resell their rice to the same extent
as it benefits rice producers? [Do first buyers] pass the assessment cost back
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whether an act can require a referendum when those most intimately
affected cannot be readily identified. Buyers of Arkansas rice come
from different states and countries and may vary from season to season.
The question, therefore, is whether an act should even attempt to require
a referendum before implementation if potential voters do not represent
an easily identifiable group.
The majority left other questions unanswered because they chose
not to address them or held that the answers were not necessary to the
decision. At the trial court and on appeal, the parties argued whether the
assessment was a valid fee or an illegal tax. 43 Because both the
chancery court and the Arkansas Supreme Court found Act 344 to be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, it was unnecessary to
address the question.'" The answer to the question could become an
issue if future legislation avoided a referendum and simply set an
assessment.
The final question unanswered was what type of due process was
violated, substantive or procedural due process. The majority simply
referred to a due process violation. 4' The majority's emphasis on the
denial of the buyer's right to vote in the referendum would seem to be
substantive due process reminiscent of Carter Coal. However, the
majority's emphasis on notice, hearing, and review would indicate a
procedural due process violation. The dissent noted that Gulf Rice's
counsel claimed a procedural due process violation at oral argument.
46
If the violation was only procedural, future legislation might pass
constitutional muster by providing the safeguards of notice, hearing, and
review. However, the court's emphasis on the impropriety of delegating
to a private group the power to impose an assessment on another private
group would indicate that the court intended to implicate both types of
due process.
The chancery court and Arkansas Supreme Court decisions have
already impacted legislation. The Eighty-Second General Assembly
amended the enabling legislation for the Arkansas Rice Research and
to rice producers by reducing the price paid for the rice?... [T] what extent
are the producers also first buyers[?]. . . Can first buyers, who are global in
scope, be identified for referendum purposes?
Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 436-37, 994 S.W.2d at 487 (Brown, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
143. See id. at 434 n.3, 994 S.W.2d at 486 n.3.
144. See id., 994 S.W.2d at 486 n.3.
145. See id. at 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
146. See id. at 436, 994 S.W.2d at 487 (Brown, J., dissenting).
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Promotion Board in Act 16 of 1999 ("Act 16"). "4 Act 16 repealed
Arkansas Code Annotated section 2-20-506, which provided for a
referendum in each county.'48 Act 16 amended Arkansas Code
Annotated section 2-20-507 to repeal the provisions authorizing the
producer referendum.'49 Act 16 provides an assessment of $0.0135 per
bushel on the first buyers and $0.0135 per bushel on rice producers.5 0
Act 16 repealed the refund provision' and amended the use of funds
provision to add that the funds could be used to defray costs of referenda
that the Board may refer to producers or purchasers of rice.'52
The limitation on delegation of legislative authority established by
the Gulf Rice court restricted the power of the General Assembly to
authorize a private group of people (rice producers) to impose an
assessment on another private group of people (rice buyers).,5 3 The
court did not limit the legislature's authority to condition the
effectiveness of an assessment on a favorable referendum by those who
had to pay the assessment; 54 however, the court found an assessment
through a referendum that did not involve all those affected to be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.'"
Benjamin McCorkle*
147. Act of Feb. 4, 1999, No. 16 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 2-20-501 to -510
(Michie Supp. 1999)).
148. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-20-506 (Michie Supp. 1999).
149. See id. § 2-20-507.
150. See id.
151. See id. § 2-20-509.
152. See id. § 2-20-5 10.
153. See Gulf Rice, 338 Ark. at 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at 486.
154. See id. at 433, 994 S.W.2d at 484-85.
155. See id. at 433-34, 994 S.W.2d at486.
* J.D. expected May 2001; B.A. 1970,TexasTechUniversity; M.A. 1971,Texas
Tech University.
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